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THE COUNTER-ATTACK TO RETAKE THE
CITADEL CONTINUES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES OF REPOSE
IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ANDREW R. TURNER
N 1960, THE YEAR of the "fall of the citadel," in the words
of Dean Prosser,' approximately 50,000 products liability suits
were brought.! Since then, the imposition of strict liability and the
elimination of the requirement of privity have enlarged the scope
of a manufacturer's potential liability to consumers of his product.!
Due at least in part to these relaxed requirements' the number of
products liability suits has increased; in 1972 some 500,000 cases
were filed and in 1977 over 1,000,000 were brought.! The rising
number of claims has led to dramatic increases in the cost of
products liability insurance.! Higher insurance costs in turn have
led many companies to implement self-insurance programs or to
accept higher figures for deductibles in their commercial products
liability insurance policies as an alternative to passing the in-
creased costs along to the consumer in the form of higher prices."
The most significant factor alleged to be the cause of the nation-
wide products liability insurance problem is the responsibility of
manufacturers and sellers for older products-the "long-tail" prob-
IProsser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Fall of the Citadel]. Although Prosser referred to the citadel of privity,
this paper will use the term more generally to mean the citadel of strict liability.
:G. SULLIVAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: WHO NEEDS IT? 16 (1979).
3 THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LIABILITY, 5 PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY].
4 G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 2.
'Id. at 16.
6 See Hoenig, Products Liability Problems and Proposed Reforms, 1977
INS. L.J. 213, 215 n.5.
7 Note, When the Product Ticks: Products Liability and Statutes of Limita-
tions, 11 IND. L. REV. 693, 694-701 (1978). See generally Impact on Product
Liability: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Small Business, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as Senate Small Business Hearings].
8 G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 17, 150.
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lem.! The long-tail problem involves manufacturers' and sellers'
continued responsibility for defects in products many years after
the products have left their control.0 Statistics compiled by the
Insurance Services Office show that the concern of manufacturers
and their insurers about the magnitude of the long-tail problem
may be unwarranted." Nonetheless, their concern about potential
losses associated with older products is an important element in
the increase in the costs of liability insurance."
There is a fundamental difference of opinion over the issue of
the need to reform tort law to resolve the long-tail problem.'"
Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that the present system is satisfactory,"
while manufacturers and insurers disagree and have proposed a
variety of reforms in the law of products liability.'" The most
prominent of these proposals has been the call for adoption of a
statute of repose, essentially a statute of limitations based on the
age of the product rather than the date any loss or injury occurred."
In its effect, a statute of repose defines substantive rights and may
preclude a right to sue from coming into existence." Modifying
existing two- or three-year statutes of limitation so that they begin
to run when a product enters commerce would have a direct and
9 Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Products Liability Law-A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 221, 234-44 (1978-1979).
'0 "Long tail" refers to the virtually open-ended potential for liability facing
manufacturers and sellers. See Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of
Products Liability Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C. L. R v. 663, 664-65 (1978).
"See INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY CLOSED CLAIM SUR-
VEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS 81-83 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as ISO CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY], indicating that over 97% of all products
liability claims arose within six years of purchase, and in situations involving
capital goods over 83% arose within ten years of manufacture. But see Senate
Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 471, wherein the National Machine
Tool Builders' Association provided information showing that almost one half
of the product suits against its members involve machines over twenty years
old.
. TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at VII-21.
13G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 257.
14 See, e.g., Senate Small Business Hearings, supra note 7, at 660-83 (testimony
of Robert G. Begam, President, Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
"3 G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 257. See generally Senate Small Business
Hearings, supra note 7.
1' G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 257.
"See White v. Violent Crimes Comp. Bd., 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206, 209
(1978).
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immediate impact on reducing products liability insurance costs."
The statutes which have been proposed, however, would operate
as "outer" statutes of limitations, abolishing the right to bring
any products liability lawsuits after the passage of an extended
period of years running from the date of manufacture or first sale
of the product." Such a statutory scheme would reduce insurance
underwriters' fear of claims arising from injuries caused by very
old products because it would provide a clearly delineated basis
for the exercise of underwriting judgment.' Legislatures currently
have adopted products liability statutes of repose in eighteen
states."
I. BACKGROUND: THE FALL OF THE CITADEL
The citadel of privity evolved from Winterbottom v. Wright2"
'8 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIAmLrrY: INSURANCE STrUDy 4-4,
4-5 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE INSURANCE STUDY]. See also
Minichello & Orpett, Beat the Clock: The New Products Liability Statute of
Limitations in Illinois, 67 ILL. B.J. 414 (1979).
19See, e.g., I OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1979), which reads: "[A] product
liability civil action shall be commenced not later than eight years after the date
on which the product was first purchased for use or consumption." See also
state statutes cited in note 56 infra; DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTrrUTE, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY POSITION PAPER 22-23 (1976); TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE
COUNSEL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY POSITION PAPER 14 (1978); Massery, Date-of-Sale
Statutes of Limitation-A New Immunity for Product Suppliers, 1977 INS. L.J.
535 (1977).
20TASK FORCE INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-92. By limiting a
manufacturer's liability for defective products to a clearly defined period of
years, insurance underwriters can estimate more closely the probable number
of defects which will occur.
215 ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1979); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551
(Supp. 1979); 6 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-21-402, 403(3) (Supp. 1979); 27
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a (West Supp. 1980); 7 FLA. STAT. ANN.
5 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1980); 29 GA. CODE. ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp.
1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, S 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1980)); 4A KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b)
(1976); 15 Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224
(Cum. Supp. 1978); 4A N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979); IA
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1979); 5A N.D. CENT. CODE
§28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1979); 1 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1979); 6 S.D. COMp.
LAWS ANN. S 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1980); 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23.3703 (Cum.
Supp. 1979); 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977).
2 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 10 M&W 109 (Ex. 1842). See 1 PROD. LIAB. REP.
(CCH) 54500 (1970). The case held that breach of a contract to keep a
mailcoach in repair gave no cause of action against the contractor to the driver
who was injured when the coach collapsed due to a latent defect. Lord Abinger,
Chief Baron, commented that no action would lie because:
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which held that a contractor, manufacturer or vendor would not
be liable in tort to third parties who were not in contractual privity
with it." Ten years later, in 1852, the New York Court of Appeals
in Thomas v. Winchester" recognized a major exception to the
requirement of privity, holding that a seller would be liable to a
third person for negligence in the preparation and sale of inherently
dangerous products.' There the fortress of liability for negligence
stood for over sixty years until, in 1916, Judge Cardozo so widened
the exception for inherently dangerous products" that the excep-
tion effectively swallowed the rule."' In MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co." the court decided that manufacturers, by placing their prod-
ucts on the market, assumed a responsibility to the consumer to
exercise reasonable caution in manufacturing those products, not
because of any contractual relationship between the parties but
because of the foreseeability of harm if proper care was not used."
The attack on the requirement of privity and the movement
towards strict liability continued in cases based upon express war-
ranties' and in implied warranty cases involving food' and prod-
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if
plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along
the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might
bring a similar action. Unless we confine the operation of such
contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,
would ensue.
10 M&W at 114.
"a 1 PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 5 4501 (1970); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw Or' TORTS § 93 (4th ed. 1971).
2 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1100 (1960). Thomas v. Winchester held that a pharmacist was liable
to a third person for negligently labeling a poison as a harmless medicine.
22 6 N.Y. at 409-10. Prosser points out that the categorizing of "inherently
dangerous" products led to rather pointless disputes over whether such products
as soap, chewing tobacco and beverage containers were inherently dangerous.
See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 96 nn.16-19, and cases cited therein.
"MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
'
7 W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 96.
8217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
"Id. at 389, 111 N.E. 1054 (1916).
"E.g., Hansen v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 276 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1960);
Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd on rehearing, 168 Wash. 45, 15 P.2d
1118 (1932).
31 E.g., Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939);
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ucts for intimate bodily use.' Finally, in 1960, the citadel of privity
fell. The New Jersey Supreme Court declared that a manufacturer
was strictly liable when an article which it had placed on the
market, knowing that it was to be used without inspection for
defects, proved to have a defect that caused injury to a human.3'
That case, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,3 ' quickly was ac-
cepted as implying a warranty of safety for goods other than food
and cosmetics. ' Three years later the California Supreme Court,
in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,' went beyond Hen-
ningsen and established the doctrine of strict liability in tort."
Greenman became a precedent for cases in other jurisdictions and
helped to pave the way for the adoption of section 402A of the
American Law Institute's Second Restatement of Torts.3'
After the fall of the citadel it appeared that consumers had won
the battle. Plaintiffs no longer were required to prove negligence
by the manufacturer or to show privity with the manufacturer to
recover for injuries sustained through the use of defective prod-
ucts.' In the last fifteen years, however, faced with an ever-growing
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927);
Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y.2d 195, 173 N.E.2d 773, 213 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
32E.g., Prichard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961); Graham v. Battenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954); Rogers v.
Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 N.E.2d 612 (1958).
3' Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 77, 83
(1960). The court was unable to see the rationale for differentiating between a
fly in a bottled beverage and a defective car with its greater potential for
harm. Id. at 83. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir.
1959), is considered by some to have been the first decision to break down the
walls of the citadel. (The presentation of the development of the law of products
liability in this paper is a summation of only two of the major legal barriers
which were overcome, and is not intended to be a complete treatment of the
development of products liability. See generally Fall of the Citadel, supra note 1.)
- 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
35W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 97.
3' Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
V Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the court, stated: "[T]he liability is not
one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict liability
in tort." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 61, 377 P.2d 897,
901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
33 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See Fall of the Citadel,
supra note 1, at 802-04.
9Comment, Statutes of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the
Citadel of Strict Liability, 23 S.D. L. REv. 149, 150 (1978). For a brief but
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number of suits, many involving older products,'* and the high
costs of defending such suits,' manufacturers and insurers have
begun their counter-attack against the citadel of strict liability.
Various weapons have been suggested for use in this counter-
attack, only one of which is the statute of repose. Another alterna-
tive is an outer statute of limitations based not upon a fixed period
of years but upon the useful safe life of a product.' Under this
type of statute, a manufacturer may be held liable only for harms
caused during the useful safe life of the product.' The principle
problem with such a statute is that the concept of useful safe life
is unduly vague." Manufacturers are usually relieved of liability
where prolonged use of a product indicates that normal wear and
tear, and not a defect, is responsible for the injury. ' The question
then arises as to what constitutes the useful life of any given
product so that normal wear and tear may be analyzed and de-
fined. ' The common law of most states dictates that the age of
an allegedly defective product must be considered in light of its
expected useful life and the stress to which it has been subjected."
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act enumerates factors
which may be helpful in analyzing this question,'" but the inherent
thorough discussion of the three theories of recovery in products liability cases
(negligence, warranty, and strict liability), see id. at 150-59.
" See text accompanying notes 2-6 supra.
41 An Insurance Services Office study determined that in 1976 the average
legal expense of defending a products liability suit involving bodily injury was
$3,500, and that for every dollar paid in claims thirty-five cents was expended
in defending bodily injury cases and forty-eight cents was expended in defending
cases involving property damage. G. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 16.
"TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 27. See also 38 MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1980).
43MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABIITrrY ACT S 110, Analysis, 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,733 (1979) [hereinafter ctied as UPLA Analysis].
44Id.
ISee, e.g., Gates v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 458 (10th Cir. 1974);
Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1972); Tucker v. Unit
Crane & Shovel Corp., 526 Or. 318, 473 P.2d 862 (1970).
Comment, supra note 39, at 177-79.
,UPLA Analysis, supra note 43, at 62,733, citing Kuisis v. Baldwin-Lima-
Hamilton Corp. 457 Pa. 321, 319 A.2d 914, 923 (1974) (brake locking mechanism
on crane failed after it had been in use for more than twenty years). As the
Kuisis court observed: "[I1n certain situations the prolonged use factor may
loom so large as to obscure all others in a case." Id.
"MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT S 110 (a) (1), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732
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vagueness of the concept poses a major obstacle. Another sugges-
tion is to require the plaintiff to adopt and pursue only one theory
of recovery, either strict liability, negligence or warranty." Other
alternatives include allowing manufacturers to use the state of
the art as an absolute defense,50 requiring courts to select non-
partisan expert witnesses,' and eliminating the amount of damages
sought from the pleadings.'
II. STATUTES OF REPOSE
The main purpose of a statute of limitations is to compel the
exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the
opposing party has a reasonable opportunity to defend itself. 3
The modern rule, often termed the "discovery" rule, is that the
statute of limitations does not begin to run until an injury is or
(1979) [hereinafter cited as UPLA]:
(a) The amount of wear and tear to which the product had been
subject;
(b) The effect of deterioration from natural causes, and from
climate and other conditions under which the product was used or
stored;
(c) The normal practices of the user, similar users, and the
product seller with respect to the circumstances, frequency and
purposes of the product's use, and with respect to repairs, renewals,
and replacements;
(d) Any representations, instructions, or warning made by the
product seller concerning proper maintenance, storage, and use of
the product or the expected useful safe life of the product; and
(e) Any modification or alteration of the product by a user or
third party.
49TASK FORcE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 36. This suggested modification
would, in effect, allow defendants to prevail because of a mistaken choice in
pleading. Because it exalts form over substance, it is difficult to see any advantage
to this proposal except its recognition that negligence and fault concepts have
not been forgotten.
50 d. at 38-42. This alternative may have the effect of prolonging dangerous
industry practices by decreasing the incentive to change those practices. Id. at 39.51Id. at 44. Although there would be cost advantages to this alternative, it
would entail a loss of the "partisan watchdog." Under the present system, it is
up to the finder of fact to weigh the credibility of experts when they conflict.
This proposal, however, could lead to full authority being vested in the expert
selected by the court, allowing for little or no comparison of competing theories.
"See 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-4 (1977).
"See generally 51 AM. JuR. 2D Limitations of Action § 17 (1970). This
purpose encompasses notions of evidentiary fairness and equity and recognizes
realistic problems such as the liability of a successor corporation for the liabilities
of its predecessor.
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should have been discovered.' Because the discovery rule exposes
a manufacturer to virtually open-ended liability for defects in its
products, manufacturing and insurance industry spokesmen have
called for statutes of repose which begin to run earlier, at the time
a product is manufactured or is first sold to a consumer or user.35
Such statutes have been adopted in many states," and the Depart-
ment of Commerce has promulgated a model uniform act con-
54 See, e.g., Whitfield v. Roth, 10 Cal. 3d 874, 519 P.2d 588, 112 Cal. Rptr.
540 (1974); Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 150 N.W.2d 94 (1967);
Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969). See generally W. PRossER,
supra note 23, at § 30. In states not following the discovery rule, it would seem
a conventional statute of limitations would provide the protection afforded by
a statute of repose.
-"See, e.g., DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 20.
" 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-502 (Supp. 1979) ("10 years after the manufactured
product is first put to use"); 4 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1979)
("twelve years after the product was first sold for use or consumption"); 6
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1979) ("[tlen years after a product
is first sold for use or consumption"); 27 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a
(West Supp. 1980) ("ten years from the date that such party last parted with
possession or control of the product"); 7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2) (West
Supp. 1980) ("12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product
to its original purchaser"); 29 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106 (Supp. 1979) ("10
years from the date of the first sale for use"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, 5 22.2(b)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) ("12 years from the date of first sale, lease or
delivery of possession by a seller or 10 years from the date of first sale, lease, or
delivery of possession to its initial user, consumer, or other non-seller, whichever
period expires earlier"); IND. CODE 5 33-1-1.5-5 (IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-5
(Burns Supp. 1980)) ("ten [10] years after the delivery of the product to the
initial user"); 4A KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976) ("ten years beyond
the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action"); 15 Ky. REV. STAT.
S 411.310(1) (Supp. 1980) ("five (5) years after the date of sale of the first
consumer or more than eight (8) years after the date of manufacture"); NEB.
REV. STAT. S 25-224 (Cum. Supp. 1978) ("ten years after the date when the
product which allegedly caused the personal injury, death, or damage was first
sold or leased for use"); 4A N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 507-D:2 (Supp. 1979)
("12 years after the manufacturer of the final product parted with its possession
and control or sold it, whichever occurred last"); IA N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 1-52(16)
(Cum. Supp. 1979) ("10 years from the last act or omission of the defendant");
5A N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.02 (Supp. 1979) ("within ten years of the date
of initial purchase for use or consumption, or within eleven years of the date
of manufacture"); 1 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1979) ("eight years after the
date on which the product was first purchased for use"); 6 S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15-2-12.1 (Supp. 1980) ("six years after the date of the delivery of the com-
pleted product to its first purchaser or lessee who was not engaged in the business
of selling such product"); 5 TENN. CODE ANN. S 23-3703 (Cum. Supp. 1979)
("ten years from the date on which the product was first purchased for use or
consumption, or within one year after the expiration of the anticipated life of
the product, whichever is the shorter"); 9A UTAH CODE ANN. 5 78-15-3 (1977)
("six years after the date of initial purchase for use or consumption, or ten
years after the date of manufacture").
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taining a statute of repose." While suit still must be filed within the
usual statutory period running from the date of discovery of the
loss or injury, the suit also must be filed within a longer period
running from the date of the product's manufacture or sale to a
consumer.' If this requirement is not met, the statute of repose,
like a conventional statute of limitations," may bar the action.
Thus, a statute of repose tends to function like an "outer" statute
of limitations, setting forth the maximum allowable time during
which suit may be brought, without regard for the date of the
plaintiff's injury.'" Some of the statutes contain an absolute outer
limit which may expose them to constitutional challenge based
57 UPLA, § 110(B), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1979), which reads as follows:
(B) Statute of Repose.
(1) Generally. In claims that involve harm caused more than
ten (10) years after time of delivery, a presumption arises that
the harm was caused after the useful life had expired. This
presumption may only be rebutted by clear and convincing
evidence.
(2) Limitations on Statute of Repose.
(a) If a product seller expressly warrants that its product can
be utilized safely for a period longer than ten (10) years, the
period of repose, after which the presumption created in sub-
section (B)(1) arises, shall be extended according to that warranty
or promise.
(b) The ten- (10-) year period of repose established in Sub-
section (B) (1) does not apply if the product seller intentionally
misrepresents facts about its product, or fraudulently conceals
information about it, and that conduct was a substantial cause
of the claimant's harm.
(c) Nothing contained in Subsection (B) shall affect the right
of any person found liable under this Act to seek and obtain
contribution or indemnity from any other person who is responsible
for harm under this Act.
(d) The ten- (10-) year period of repose established in Sub-
section (B) (1) shall not apply if the harm was caused by prolonged
exposure to a defective product, or if the injury-causing aspect
of the product that existed at the time of delivery was not dis-
coverable by an ordinary reasonably prudent person until more
than ten (10) years after the time of delivery, or if the harm,
caused within ten (10) years after the time of delivery, did not
manifest itself until after that time.
Id. See generally Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9 (discussion of UPLA).
"See, e.g., 5 ALA. CODE S 6-5-502 (Supp. 1979); 6 CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-403 (Supp. 1979); 4A KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976).
59See generally Note, supra note 7, at 702-03.
'* Some state statutes of repose apply to strict liability and negligence suits,
while statutes of repose in other states apply only to strict liability suits.
Compare, e.g., 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1979) with 4 A,,uz REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12-551 (Supp. 1979).
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upon an alleged violation of due process. 1 Others embody a flexible
outer limit so that a person who is injured by a defective product
a few days before the expiration of the statute of repose may
bring suit within the applicable tort statute of limitations, not-
withstanding the prohibition within the statute of repose."
A. Benefits and Detriments
Manufacturers of long-lived products, such as aircraft, would
benefit from the operation of a statute of repose." Such statutes
afford the manufacturer security against the accrual of claims years
after its products leave its hands." Three grounds typically are offer-
ed in support of these statutes. First, statutes of repose are justified
by the policy consideration that persons should be allowed to plan
their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty." This stability,
achieved by limiting the time within which a claim may be brought,
promotes greater accuracy in determining the costs of liability for
defective products. In this way, statutes of repose also contribute
to actuarial certainty in the setting of rates for insurance." Sec-
ond, the statutes are intended to avoid the evidentiary problems
which may face the defendant in a suit involving an old product."
"' See text accompanying notes 171-73 infra.
12 See Phillips, supra note 10, at 666. Compare, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT.
S 25-224(2) (Cum. Supp. 1978) with IND. CODE § 33-1-5-5 (IND. CODE ANN.
§34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1980)).
"See Massery, supra note 19, at 542-43. Massery notes an example of the
possible harshness of the operation of a statute of repose in an aviation accident
case in which twelve Air Force personnel were killed in a crash of a 20-year-old
Convair T-29. Adams v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 385 F. Supp. 890 (N.D. Cal.
1974), afl'd, 535 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 905, rehearing
denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977). Discovery in the case revealed that the manu-
facturer had long been aware of the incidence of defective frame castings in
that model of aircraft, the cause of the crash, yet failed to warn of the danger.
If a statute of repose had been in force in this case the plaintiffs would have
been barred from bringing suit, despite the fact that the manufacturer may
have hidden the fatal defect from the aircraft's users. Massery further points
out that the average age of a Boeing 707 now in fleet use is ten years.
"Wallace, Products Liability-Current Developments and Directions, 43
INS. COUNSEL J. 519, 525 (1976).
6" See UPLA Analysis, supra note 43, at 62,734; Phillips, A Synopsis of the
Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 317, 374 (1978-79).
See also Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879); 51 AM. Jua. 2D Limita-
tions of Actions S 18 (1970).
" See UPLA Analysis, supra note 43, at 62,733.
6 See id. at 62,734. The evidentiary problems in suits involving older products
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Third, some proponents assert that prolonged safe use of a product
is at least an indication that it was not defective at its delivery."
The opponents of statutes of repose are quick to point out the
major inequity inherent in the statutes-that they may bar meri-
torious claims." This criticism is particularly true in cases where
product-related injuries are not discoverable for many years after
exposure to the defect or where injuries are caused by defects in
durable goods." Further, the opponents raise serious doubts whether
any significant control of insurance costs would result from adop-
tion of statutes of repose."' A study by the Insurance Services
include lost evidence, faded memories and inability to locate witnesses. See also
Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Builders-Blueprints
for Non-Action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 371 (1969). See generally American
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554, rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952
(1974); Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).
"8 UPLA Analysis, supra note 43, at 62,734; contra, Massery, supra note 19,
at 543. Massery states that the fact that a product operates for a long time
without any defects does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that all such
producs are free of defects. He points out that manufacturers can discover and
have discovered defects in older products. Therefore, Massery argues, for a
manufacturer to state that because it is unable to foresee defects in old
products, it should not be held responsible for those defects, is "quite simply an
inaccuracy." Id. See also 6 CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1979) and
15 Ky. REv. STAT. § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1980), which raise a presumption
that the product was not defective if the accident occurred more than a specified
time after the product was first sold.
60 Johnson, Products Liability "Reform": A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.
L. REv. 677, 689-90 (1978); Massery, supra note 19, at 544; Vargo & Leibman,
Products Liability, 12 IND. L. REV. 227, 250 (1979). Cf. Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 335 N.E.2d 275, 278, 373 N.Y.S.2d
39, 43 (1975) (quoting from Breitel, J., dissenting in Mendel v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 346, 253 N.E.2d 207, 211, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490,
495 (1969): "[I]t is all but unthinkable that a person should be time-barred from
prosecuting a cause of action before he ever had one."); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252
S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173, 190 (1969) ("Mere passage of time should not
excuse [the defendant] if its negligence was the cause.").
'0In Diamond v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 366 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. App. 1979),
recovery was denied the child of a woman who had taken a drug while pregnant
in 1956. In 1976 it was discovered that the drug caused cancer in the children
of mothers who had taken it. Plaintiff, who filed suit in 1977, was barred by
the twelve-year statute of repose which, the court ruled, had expired in 1968.
Id. at 1222. See also 5 TENN. CODE ANN. S 23-3703(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979)
(excepting from operation of statute of repose any action resulting from ex-
posure to asbestos). See generally Johnson, supra note 69, at 690-91 (discussing
injuries arising many years after chemical exposure and injuries caused by
durable goods); Massery, supra note 19, at 544 (discussing "diseases of progress"
such as asbestosis and beryliosis).
7 Johnson, supra note 69, at 680, 691; Massery, supra note 19, at 545.
See also TASK FORCE INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-92 to 94.
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Office disclosed that only 2.8% of all claims for bodily injury
arise more than ten years from the date of a product's manufac-
ture."2 Finally, there are fears that an absolute statutory bar would
reduce the incentive for manufacturers to work for long-term
product safety. ' Product liability lawsuits give manufacturers that
incentive to ensure the long-term safety of their products."' If a
statute of repose were enacted, the manufacturer would no longer
have as strong an economic reason to produce a product that
would continue to be safe beyond the statutory period. '
It has been suggested that a statute of repose does little more
than codify a uniform "wearing-out time" for all products."'
Because of the wide variations in product life, any statutory
period sufficiently long to avoid the inequity of a common limita-
tion for all products would have little, if any, impact on insurance
costs." Although similar statutes have been enacted to benefit
architects and builders," the differences between buildings and
other structures and manufactured goods militate against exten-
sion of statutes of repose to manufacturers of products." Build-
ings operate against gravity twenty-four hours a day so that any
structural weaknesses are likely to appear within a short time."
Some products, however, may sit unused for several years, unex-
posed to the risks of use."' As one author noted: "To grant the
same immunity to product manufacturers as that granted to archi-
tects is to deny the realities of product use and exposure.""
Courts have frequently disregarded the policy of repose inherent
" ISO CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY, supra note 11, at 81.
"
3 Johnson, supra note 69, at 691; Massery, supra note 19, at 544.
'
4 Johnson, supra note 69, at 691.
7I Id. Massery, supra note 19, at 544.
' Phillips, supra note 10, at 673. Three of the statutes only codify a presump-
tion that the product has worn out. See 6 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3)
(Supp. 1979); 15 Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.310(1) (Supp. 1980); UPLA 5 110(B), 44
Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1979).
'"TASK FORCE INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-93.
78 See generally Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d
662 (1972); Comment, supra note 67. Similar statutes have also been enacted
in the field of medical malpractice.
"Massery, supra note 19, at 546-47.
'* Id. at 546.
81 Id. at 547.
82 Id.
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in statutes of limitation where the interests of justice required
vindication of the plaintiff's rights.' Even proponents of statutes
of repose have recognized that courts may liberalize negligence
rules in favor of plaintiffs to avoid the harsh operation of the
statutes."' This action may be explained because of the heavy
burden on a plaintiff in a products liability case. The plaintiff
must show that the defect was present in the product when it
left the defendant's hands and that it was not caused by normal
wear or improper maintenance.' Realistically, he also may have
to explain why other persons over the years have not been simi-
larly injured by an old product." In addition, the plaintiff is faced
with the same evidentiary problems burdening the defendant manu-
facturer."7 Therefore, it appears that obtaining the two benefits
stressed by proponents of the statutes-actuarial certainty and
avoidance of evidentiary problems"-is uncertain given the detri-
mental effects such statutes may have."
B. Tolling
There are several instances in which the running of a statute of
repose is extended or tolled. A statute of repose is extended when
the manufacturer expressly warrants the product for longer than
the statutory period." In a jurisdiction with a statute of repose,
8"See, e.g., Burnett v. New York Cent. R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965);
Chappell v. Emco Mach. Works Co., 601 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1979).
See also 51 AM. Jur. 2D Limitations of Action § 18 (1970).
"Note, supra 7, at 718 (prediction by commentator for the Independent
Insurance Agents of America).
"Mitchell v. Ford Motor Co., 533 F.2d 19, 20-21, (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 871 (1976); Kaczmarek v. Mesta Mach. Co., 463 F.2d 675 (3d Cir.
1972). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS §402A, comment g (1965);
W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 57, 241D (1979).
"Johnson, supra note 69, at 691, citing Gomez v. Bliss, 27 Misc. 2d 649,
211 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup. Ct. 1969) and Schindley v. Allen-Sherman-Hoff Co.,
157 F.2d 102 (6th Cir. 1946). See also W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 85,
at § 226.
'7See Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53, 56 (1974).
See also note 67 supra.
88See UPLA Analysis, supra note 43, at 62,733-34; Wallace, supra note 64,
at 525; Comment, supra note 67, at 371.
"See Johnson, supra note 69, at 689-91; Massery, supra note 19, at 544,
546-47; Phillips, supra note 10, at 673; Vargo & Leibman, supra note 69, at 250.
"Phillips, supra note 10, at 668. See, e.g., UPLA § 110(B) (2) (a), 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,732 (1979) (text reprinted at note 57 supra).
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however, one may inquire whether the statute would reduce the
economic incentive for manufacturers to warrant their products
for such a longer period or to warn of or to repair defects dis-
covered after the statutory period.9' This criticism is especially
applicable to capital equipment." Unless the manufacturer ex-
pressly warrants that a capital good will last beyond the statutory
period, a plaintiff injured after that period will be barred from
recovery."' It seems illogical to afford a manufacturer a blanket
exemption beyond the statutory period merely because he avoids
using language establishing an express warranty."4
Whether a statute of repose would be tolled by conventional
tolling exceptions is unclear." A court might use such exceptions
to ameliorate the harsh effects of the operation of the statute,
weakening its impact." The application of the tolling exceptions
would undermine the purpose of the statute by extending the time
during which a manufacturer may be held liable beyond the statu-
tory period." Several jurisdictions have incorporated tolling excep-
tions within the statutory language." If the statute of repose does
not apply tolling provisions or is interpreted to prevent tolling,
e' See generally Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 244-45.
92 Id. Under statutes which raise only a presumption against the plaintiff, e.g.,
6 COLO. REv. STAT. S 13-21-403(3) (Supp. 1979) and UPLA § 110(B), 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,732 (1979), it would seem the plaintiff may be able to overcome the
presumption.
"See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 244.
4 Id.
11Likely tolling exceptions include situations involving continuing duties
(such as to correct or warn) and subsequently arising duties (from continuous
servicing), cumulative injuries from multiple uses of the defendant's product
(such as conditions which may develop after multiple doses of drugs or repeated
exposure to asbestos), contribution or indemnity, fraudulent concealment, death,
infancy, insanity, imprisonment, and absence of the defendant from the jurisdic-
tion. See Minichello & Orpett, supra note 18, at 415; Phillips, supra note 10, at
666-72. See also Moviecolor Ltd. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 228 F.2d 80 (2d Cir.
1961) (fraudulent concealment).
Phillips, supra note 10, at 666-72.
"Phillips, supra note 65, at 374-75.
" See, e.g., 5 ALA. CODE § 6-5-501(2) (Supp. 1979) (contribution or in-
demnity); 7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.051(1) (Supp. 1980) (absence from thejurisdiction); 5 TENrN. CODE ANN. § 23.3703 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (minority);
UPLA S l10(B)(2)(b), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,732 (1979) (text reprinted at note 57
supra) (fraudulent concealment).
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one commentator has suggested that it may be held to violate due
process protections.""
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The law dealing with constitutional issues raised in cases in-
volving products liability statutes of repose is sparse. Only Florida
has ruled explicitly on the constitutionality of a products liability
statute of repose, 00 although courts in Connecticut, Oregon and
North Carolina have applied statutes of repose in products lia-
bility cases." In the analogous area of statutes of repose for
architects and builders, courts have considered arguments based
upon the equal protection and due process clauses and upon vari-
ous state constitutional provisions.
In Connecticut, the Supreme Court applied a three-year tort
statute of limitations running from the date of the "act or omis-
sion complained of"'02 to bar a strict liability claim for injuries
arising from an automobile accident which occurred in 1961.0
The car had been sold in 1959; the accident occurred in October
of 1961, and the plaintiff did not file suit until July of 1964. To
explain the anomalous possibility that an action may be barred
before it accrues, the court cited a case it had decided several years
earlier upholding the constitutionality of a related statute.'"
9" Massery, supra note 19, at 548. See also IND. CODE § 33-1-1.5-5 (IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-20A-5 (Bums Supp. 1980)) ("applies to all persons regardless of
minority or legal disability"); 5A N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02(2) (Supp.
1979) ("shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal dis-
ability"); 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3(2) (1977) ("shall apply to all persons,
regardless of minority or other legal disability").
100Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).
101 See Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 365 A.2d 1180
(1976); Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima Hamilton Co., 292 N.C. 260, 232 S.E.2d
431 (1977); Raftery v. William C. Vick Constr. Co., 292 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d
405 (1976); Ward v. Hotpoint Div., General Elec. Co., 35 N.C. App. 495,
241 S.E.2d 710 (1978); Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53
(1974).
12 9 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577 (1979). To construe the statutory language,
the court looked to the case law interpreting the negligence statute of repose, 9
CONN. GEN. STAT. S 52-584 (1979). Under the latter statute, the "act or omission
complained of" was deemed to be the sale of the defective product. Prokolkin v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 365 A.2d at 1183.1 03 Prokolkin v. General Motors Corp., 170 Conn. 289, 365 A.2d 1180 (1976).
104 365 A.2d at 1184, citing Vilcinskas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 144 Conn.
170, 127 A.2d 814 (1956) (upholding 27 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584 (1979)),
1981]
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The Oregon Supreme Court, in a products liability setting, up-
held the constitutionality of that state's ten-year negligence statute
of repose." The court stated that there were legitimate public
policies " served by the statute which enabled it to withstand an
attack based upon a provision of the Oregon Constitution guar-
anteeing a remedy for every injury."' Three years later, in 1977,
the Oregon Legislature passed an eight-year products liability
statute of repose."8
Prior to 1979, the North Carolina courts had avoided the typi-
cally harsh effects of the operation of statutes of repose by in-
terpreting that state's statute"0 to enlarge rather than restrict the
time in which to sue where a plaintiff's injury was "not readily
apparent" at the time it occurred."' The courts interpreted the
statute to remedy the failure of North Carolina to adhere to the
discovery rule in tort cases.1" In jurisdictions which do not follow
the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run at the
in which the court said:
There is no reason, constitutional or otherwise, which prevents
the legislature from enacting a statute . . . which starts the limita-
tion on actions for negligence running from the date of "the act or
omission complained of," even though at that date no person has
sustained damage and therefore no cause of action has come into
existence.
144 Conn. at 174-75, 127 A.2d at 816.
105 Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974).
106 The policies the court noted were the lack of evidence after the lapse of long
periods of time and the idea of allowing people after the passage of a reasonable
time to plan their affairs with a degree of certainty, free from the disruptions
of protracted and unknown potential liability. 530 P.2d at 56.
107 Id. at 57 (interpreting OR. CONST. art. I, § 10, which reads: "[E]very man
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation").
108 1 OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1977).
109 IA N.C. GEN. STAT. S 1-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (revised and superceded,
1A N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1979)). The pertinent provisions
of the old statute read:
[A] cause of action ... having as an essential element bodily injury
to the person or a defect in or damage to property not readily appar-
ent to the claimant at the time of its origin, is deemed to have
accrued at the time the injury was discovered . . . ; provided that
in such cases the period shall not exceed 10 years from the last
act of the defendant giving rise to the claim for relief.
IA N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-15(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
'
1 0 Raftery v. William C. Vick Constr. Co., 291 N.C. 180, 230 S.E.2d 405,
410 (1976).
111 230 S.E.2d at 409.
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date of sale of a product.11' The North Carolina courts interpreted
the statute of repose differently. If an injury was readily apparent
when it occurred, the statute would not apply; only if an injury
was not readily apparent when it occurred would the statute bar
any action, ten years after the date of sale.1 ' In 1979 the North
Carolina Legislature repealed the statute, replacing it with one
clearly worded to reverse the courts' interpretation." As yet, the
North Carolina courts have not been called upon to interpret the
new statute.
Florida, the only jurisdiction to address directly the constitu-
tionality of a products liability statute of repose, has held its
statute unconstitutional. 1 ' In Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel
Corp.,"' the trial court granted the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment based upon the Florida products liability statute
of repose."' In a per curiam opinion the Supreme Court of Florida
reversed the trial court's ruling, citing a case it had decided three
weeks earlier, Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons,"8 in which
it had invalidated Florida's statute of repose for architects and
builders."'
In an earlier case, Bauld v. J. A. Jones Construction Co.," the
11t Id.
13Id. at 410 (Crane sold in 1953 killed plaintiff's intestate in 1972. Held,
defendant not entitled to summary judgment based on the statute of limitations.)
See also Ward v. Hotpoint Div., General Elec. Co., 35 N.C. App. 495, 241
S.E.2d 710 (1978) (seven-year-old deep fat fryer, suit not brought until after
ten years from date of sale). Pinkston v. Baldwin, Lima Hamilton Co., 292
N.C. 260, 232 S.E.2d 431 (1977) (11 year-old crane).
114 IA N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52(16) (Cum. Supp. 1979), which reads in
pertinent part: "Provided that no cause of action shall accrue more than 10 years
from the last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of
action." Id.
"I Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979) (implicitly
overturning 7 FLA. STAT. ANN. §95.031(2) (West Supp. 1980)) (crane over
20 years old).
110 No. 77-6405 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Duval County Aug. 16, 1978), rev'd per curiam,
369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).
.. The statute provides: "Actions for products liability . . . must be begun
. . . in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed
product to its original purchaser . . . regardless of the date the defect in the
product ... was or should have been discovered." 7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.031(2)
(West Supp. 1980).
18369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
1197 FiA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(C) (West Supp. 1978).
110357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
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Florida court had upheld the products liability statute of repose
based upon the specific facts of that case.' At that time the applic-
able statute of limitations was four years," and the right to fie
suit would have expired on July 8, 1976. Meanwhile, the Florida
Legislature had passed the products liability statute of repose which
provided that the plaintiff had until January 1, 1976 to file suit
in any action that would be barred under the new law but that was
not barred under the old law." Bauld failed to file suit until July
6, 1976." In upholding the statute, the court pointed out that the
revisions in question did not abolish any right of access to the
courts, and that Bauld had been allowed a reasonable grace period
in which to file suit."' The key difference between Bauld and
Overland Construction Co. and Griffis was that in the latter cases
the plaintiffs' causes of action did not arise until after the running
of the period of repose. Since no judicial forum was available to
the plaintiffs, the court held that the statute violated Article I,
section 21 of the Florida Constitution, which provides that "[tihe
courts shall be open to every person for redress of injury, and
justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay.""' In
construing that constitutional provision, the court required the
legislature either to provide a reasonable alternative or to show
overpowering public necessity before it abolished a protected statu-
tory or common law right."7
Because of the similarity of statutes of repose for architects
and builders and for products liability, the law and the reasoning
of cases construing the former should be equally applicable to the
latter."' The constitutional decisions construing statutes of repose
for architects and builders are plentiful. Jurisdictions addressing
the constitutionality of such statutes have split in their decisions."'
"I Id. at 402. In 1961 the defendant installed a pneumatic message con-
veyor system which injured the plaintiff in 1972.
"'7 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(4) (West Supp. 1980).
" 1974 Fla. Laws. c. 74-382, S 36.
124 Telephone interview with John Lloyd at Lloyd & Henninger, attorney for
Pearl Bauld (February 20, 1980).
' 369 So. 2d at 402-03.
"'0FLA. CONST. art. I § 21. See notes 174-83 infra, and accompanying text.
""See Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
m E.g., Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).
12"The following cases held a state statute constitutional: Smith v. Allen-
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One jurisdiction, faced with varying facts, has both upheld and
held unconstitutional its statute.' At least forty-three jurisdictions
have enacted such statutes of repose."1
Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974); Carter v. Hartenstein, 248
Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal dismissed w.o.j., 401 U.S. 901 (1971);
Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v.
Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Howell v. Burk, 90
N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413
(1977); Joseph v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978); Good v.
Christensen, 527 P.2d 223 (Utah 1974); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v.
Central Heat & Power Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
These cases applied architects' and builders' statutes of repose; Jasinski v.
Showboat Operating Co., 459 F. Supp. 309 (D. Nev. 1978) (no discussion of
constitutional issues); Duncan v. Schuster-Graham Homes, Inc., 194 Colo. 441,
578 P.2d 637 (1978) (no constitutional issues raised); Carr v. Mississippi Valley
Elec. Co., 285 So. 2d 301 (La. App. 1973) (no discussion of constitutional
issues); Nevada Lakeshore Co., Inc. v. Diamond Elec. Inc., 89 Nev. 293, 511
P.2d 113 (1973) (no constitutional issues raised); Deschamps v. Camp Dresser
& McKee, Inc., 113 N.H. 344, 306 A.2d 771 (1973) (ruling on constitutionality
avoided by holding); Smith v. American Radiator, 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d
462 (1978), petition for review denied, 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1979) (no
constitutional issues raised); Agus v. Future Chattanooga Dev. Corp., 358 F.
Supp. 246 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (statute implied constitutional).
These cases held such statutes unconstitutional: Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v.
McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306 (1974) (See also Plant v. R. L. Reid,
Inc., 294 Ala. 155, 313 So. 2d 518 (1975)); Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons,
369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973);
Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588 (1967); Saylor v. Hall,
497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260
N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1976); Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563
P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck, 270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739
(1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d
454 (1975); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2,815 (Wyo. Sup. Ct.
May 21, 1980).
One other jurisdiction has avoided reaching the constitutional issues by
creating judicial exceptions to its statute. See Regents v. Hartford Acc. & Indem.
Co., 21 Cal. 3d 624, 581 P.2d 197, 147 Cal. Rptr. 486 (1978); Eden v. Van
Tine, 83 Cal. App. 2d 879, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1978).
130In Oole v. Oosting, 82 Mich. App. 291, 266 N.W.2d 795 (1978), the
Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Michigan statute did not violate due
process, but the court did not consider the issue of equal protection. Later that
year, however, the court held that the statute violated the equal protection clause.
Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850
(1978). Later in 1978 the court refused to consider equal protection challenges
raised by plaintiffs who were injured by design defects in products; the court
stated that the plaintiffs had no standing to raise an equal protection issue.
O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, Consulting Engrs., 84 Mich. App. 764, 270 N.W.2d
690, 691 n.2 (1978); Bouser v. City of Lincoln Park, 83 Mich. App. 167, 268
N.W.2d 332, 335 n.5 (1978).
131Reeves v. IUe Elec. Co., 551 P.2d 647 (Mont. 1976). See generally
Comment, supra note 67, at 361.
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A. Equal Protection
The architects' and builders' statutes of repose have been suc-
cessfully challenged on a variety of grounds, but the most common
challenge has been that the statutes deny equal protection of the
law to persons not covered by them.' 2 The arguments in archi-
tects' and builders' cases challenge the legislative classification as
it denies equal protection to owners and materialmen.1" In products
liability cases, an argument would exist that the challenged statute
unreasonably includes certain persons, such as manufacturers,
third-party owners of products and premises, and retailers, while it
excludes others, such as distributors and repairmen.' Most of the
state statutes, however, are worded to avoid this infirmity, either
by attempting to enumerate all the possible classes of products
liability defendants" or by applying the statute to all actions for
damages arising in a products liability setting.' It could also be
argued that the statute unreasonably applies to persons who suffer
injuries from defective products after the expiration of the statutory
period, while it does not affect those injured by a product within
the period. '
None of the statutes apply expressly to actions against the
owner of the product or the owner of the premises. The owner
of the product which caused the accident or the owner of the
premises where the accident occurred thus may be subject to lia-
"'See Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973); Muzar v. Metro
Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978); Pacific Indem.
Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1976); Loyal Order of
Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, 563 P.2d 143 (Okla. 1977); Broome v. Truluck,
270 S.C. 227, 241 S.E.2d 739 (1978); Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co.,
66 Wis.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975).
'3See, e.g., Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7, 12, 514 P.2d 568, 571 (1973).
'M See Vargo & Leibman, supra note 69, at 252.
z See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) ("one
who . . . sells, distributes, leases, assembles, installs, produces, manufactures,
fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or
otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of commerce.").
36See, e.g., 9A UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) ("where that action is
based upon . . . : (a) Breach of any implied warranties; (b) Defects in design,
inspection, testing or manufacture; (c) Failure to warn; (d) Failure to properly
instruct in the use of a product; or (e) Any other alleged defect or failure
in relation to a product.").
I" See Vargo & Leibman, supra note 69, at 252; Brief for Amicus Curiae,
Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, at 11-14, Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp.,
369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979).
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bility stemming from an accident involving an older product."
The manufacturer of the injury-causing product, however, may
escape liability entirely if the statutory period of repose has ex-
pired. It would thus seem that an equal protection unreasonable
classification argument could be made," just as it could be with
the statutes that fail to extend protection to no one but manufac-
turers and sellers.' Third-party owners of products and premises
could argue that the statute makes an unreasonable classification




Any definite statutory period of repose may virtually insulate
manufacturers of durable goods from any products liability ac-
tions and may deny plaintiffs any chance of recovery for injuries
from long-lived goods.'" Thus an equal protection argument could
be made that statutes of repose make an unreasonable distinction
between similarly-situated manufacturers and between similarly-
situated plaintiffs.'" One may legitimately question the validity of
arbitrarily distinguishing between makers of short- and long-lived
products.'" It seems, however, that the legislature would be en-
titled to make such a classification' as the contingencies of prod-
uct life make the actual time of product breakdown a question
of chance." Yet the class into which a manufacturer or plaintiff
then may fall-one involving injuries either before or after the
statutory period-would be equally a matter of chance. "
In any equal protection case the court must decide what standard
138 Vargo & Leibman, supra note 69, at 252.
139 Id.
140See, e.g., 5 TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-3703 (Cum. Supp. 1979).4I Vargo & Leibman, supra note 69, at 252.
142 See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 244.
1 4 Massery, supra note 19, at 545.
4 See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 244. Assume that two manu-
facturers, M1 and M2, both manufacture an identical product X. Consumer C1
is injured by X1 before the running of the statutory period, and consumer C2
is injured by X2 after the statutory period expires. Cl may sue Ml, but the
suit by C2 against M2 is barred even though there appears to be no reasonable
basis for treating C2 differently than Cl.
145 TASK FORCE LEGAL STUDY, supra note 3, at 10-11.
'"See Comment, supra note 39, at 176.
147 Id.
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to apply. Three tests are used: the "strict scrutiny" test,"8 the "ra-
tional basis" test,'" and the "fair and substantial relation" test."
The strict scrutiny test has been held to be inapplicable to statutes
of repose since no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are
involved."' In applying the rational basis test, courts examine not
only whether a classification results in some inequality, but also
whether there exists any rational or reasonable justification for
the classification."' Furthermore, in recent cases not involving
fundamental rights or suspect classifications, some courts have
inquired whether the classification bears a fair and substantial rela-
tion to the legitimate objects of the legislation."3 That test may
require, for example, a showing that adoption of the statute of
repose will lead to fewer product liability claims and lower insur-
ance premiums; it thus subjects the statute to a higher standard of
constitutional review than that applied under the rational basis
test.11'
14 Classifications involving fundamental rights or suspect classifications will
be subject to the strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 641-42 (1969) (residency requirement that burdens the right to travel);
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (segregated schools).
149 The rational basis test is applied where the statute in question relates only
to matters of economics or general social welfare. See, e.g., United States v.
Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy fees and access to courts).
150 The middle ground or fair and substantial relation test has never been
expressly recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court, but the Court has come close
to admitting that such a third test exists. See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17
(1975). It has been applied by a state court in a case considering an archi-
tects' and builders' statute of repose. See Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc.,
82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850 (1978). See generally, J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSMTUTIONAL LAW 425-27 (1978).
... Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d
850, 853 (1978).
"I E.g., Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 255 N.W.2d
454, 458 (1975).
1 1 See Gunther, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 25-37
(1972); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection
Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo. L.J. 1071,
1099-1103 (1974); Comment, "Newer" Equal Protection: The Impact of the
Means-Focused Model, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 665, 677-79 (1974). See, e.g., Muzar
v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850, 853 (1978).
In Michigan, the rational basis test is used primarily on experimental legislation.
See id. at 853-54. See also Massery, supra note 19, at 545.
154 Massery, supra note 19, at 546. See Gunther, supra note 153, at 44.
See also Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976),
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) (court required showing that a medical mal-
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The rational basis test is used frequently in considering equal
protection challenges to statutes of repose. Some courts have
found that the immunity granted architects and builders violates
this test when others similarly situated, such as property owners,
are not immunized from liability.' Other courts, however, have
had no difficulty in sustaining such statutes against the same
argument."
The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the New Mexico Court
of Appeals found reasons to differentiate between owners and
materialmen and the protected architects and builders.' The
Arkansas court stated:
[Owners and materialmen] are not in the same class with . . .
[architects and builders]."' Particularly is this true after construc-
tion is substantially completed and accepted by the owners. Part
of acceptance is to accept some future responsibility for the con-
dition of the premises.'"
The analysis of the New Mexico Court of Appeals is clearer. It
distinguished owners because the liability of owners and occupiers
of land under New Mexico law has a different historical back-
ground than that of architects and contractors." The court dis-
practice crisis existed and that the challenged legislation would substantially help
to avert that crisis).
"' See, e.g., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591
(1967) (materialmen).
15'See Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal
dismissed w.oj., 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104,
551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293
A.2d 662 (1972); Howell v. Burke, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Joseph v. Bums, 260 Ore. 493,
491 P.2d 203 (1971); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa.
270, 382 A.2d 715 (1975); Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heat
& Power Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d 108 (1972).
"Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918 (1970), appeal
dismissed w.o.j., 401 U.S. 901 (1971); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d
214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
158The Arkansas statute protects "any person performing or furnishing the
design, planning, supervision or observation of the construction or the construction
and repair of such improvement . . ." 3B ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-238 (Supp.
1979).
"'Carter v. Hartenstein, 248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920 (1970),
appeal dismissed w.o.j., 401 U.S. 901 (1971).
1"'Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977). Compare Chavez v. Torlina, 15 N.M.
53, 99 P. 690 (1909) (liability of owners or occupiers of land not limited)
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tinguished materialmen because defects are easier to find in a
materialman's work than in a contractor's special jobs, and be-
cause the evidentiary problems facing architects and contractors
are greater than those facing materialmen.'"' Therefore the differ-
ence in result is partially due to the wording of the particular
statutes,"6' and partially due to the interpretations given the statutes
by the respective courts.
B. Due Process
The principal due process argument made in any attack on
statutes of repose is that the legislature cannot abolish common
law rights.1 Although a vested cause of action is properly within
the protection of the due process clause,"" there is no constitutional
rule that prohibits a legislature from abolishing a right before it
vests.1 ' A legislature also may modify a vested right if it provides
a reasonable alternative to enforce the right; if it does not do so,
the statute may violate due process.'" Where the legislature pro-
vided for a reasonable grace period in which suits not barred
under the former law could be brought before becoming barred by
the new statute of repose, the Florida Supreme Court held that
with Wood v. Sloan, 20 N.M. 127, 148 P. 507 (1915) (liability of builder
limited after project completed and accepted by owner).
1"1Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
1"' DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, supra note 19, at 21.
M6 3 See Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Ky. 1973); Reeves v. Ille Elec.
Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 652 (1976); Rosenberg v. Town of North
Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 668,
568 P.2d 214, 221 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 341 A.2d
184, 188 (1975), a0'd, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978). See also text accom-
panying note 190 infra.
1'"Gibbs v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332 (1933); Pritchard v. Norton,
106 U.S. 124, 132 (1882); Barr v. Preskitt, 389 F. Supp. 496, 498 (M.D. Ala.
1974).
1"1 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-88
(1978); Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929).
16I Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-88
(1978); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). See also
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
"67 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environ. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-88
(1978); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 50 (1911). See also
Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 574-75 (Fla. 1979).
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there was no violation of due process guarantees.' Courts uni-
formly have rejected due process arguments where the cause of
action accrued after the expiration of the statutory period. 9 After
the statutory period has run, the harm is "a wrong for which the
law affords no remedy.""' °
Another due process problem may arise if the injury occurs
shortly before the expiration of the statutory period. If the applic-
able legislation does not incorporate other statutes of limitation,
a reasonable time in which to seek a remedy is denied.'' Since
due process requires that statutes of limitation allow an individual
a reasonable time in which to bring suit,'' a statute of repose
which does not embody a flexible outer limit may be subject to
challenge as an unconstitutional violation of due process.' 3
C. Impact of State Constitutional Provisions
A products liability statute of repose has been overturned on
constitutional grounds in only one state. In that case, the court
held that the statute violated a provision of the state constitution
requiring that the courts be open to afford a remedy for every
injury.' Other courts have rejected challenges based upon similar
"I Bauld v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 401-02 (Fla. 1978).
See 1974 Fla. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 74-382, § 36 (West).
119See Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Va. 1974);
Muzar v. Metro Town Houses, Inc., 82 Mich. App. 368, 266 N.W.2d 850
(1978); Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Rosen-
berg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662 (1972); Howell v.
Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d
413 (1977); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d
715 (1978).
170 Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergan, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 667
(1972). To bar a cause of action before it accrues hardly seems fair from the
perspectives of compensation and loss distribution.
'I See Oole v. Oosting, 82 Mich. App. 291, 266 N.W.2d 795, 799 (1978);
Comment, supra note 67, at 372. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
"'
72Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 242 (1944); Wilson v.
Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902); Capitan Grande Bank of Mission Indians
v. Helix Irrig. Dist., 514 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 874
(1975).
""'See Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 63 (1902). See also Comment,
supra note 67, at 372.
" Griffis v. Unit Crane & Shovel Corp., 369 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 1979). See notes
113-25 supra, and accompanying text. A large number of states have similar
provisions. See generally 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 708 (1956).
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constitutional provisions.'' The principal difference between the
two positions is the interpretation given to the relevant constitu-
tional provision."' In the two jurisdictions which held that archi-
tects' and builders' statutes of repose violated the constitutional
guarantee of open courts, the courts interpreted the provision as
applying to the legislature as well as to the courts. " They reached
that result by reading the open courts provision in conjunction with
other constitutional, statutory and common law provisions.'" In
these jurisdictions the capacity of the legislature to abolish com-
mon law rights, such as the right to sue for injuries, is severely re-
stricted or totally denied. 7' The jurisdictions holding the statute
1'5 Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (1976)
("Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and speedy remedy afforded
for every injury of person, property, or character." MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16);
Joseph v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, 207-08 (1971) ("[Elvery man
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation." ORE. CONsT. art. I, § 10); Freezer Storage, Inc. v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978) ("[A]lI courts shall
be open; and every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice ad-
ministered without sale, denial or delay." PA. CONST. art. I, S 11).
170 Compare Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979)
and Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222-25 (Ky. 1973) with Reeves v. Ille Elec.
Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (1976) and Joseph v. Burns, 260
Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, 207-08 (1971) and Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978).
1nSee Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973), in which the court states:
[W]here a right of access to the courts for redress for a particular
injury has been provided by statutory law predating the adoption
of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of Florida, or
where such rights has become a part of the common law of the
State pursuant to Fla Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is without
power to abolish such a right without providing a reasonable
alternative to protect the rights of the people of the State to redress
for injuries, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public
necessity for the abolishment of such right, and no alternative
method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.
Id. at 4. See also Commonwealth v. Werner, 280 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Ky. 1955).
't' The Florida Supreme Court has interpreted that state's open court pro-
vision in light of the common law and the statutory rights existing when Article
1 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution was adopted, and
in light of any common law rights which became the common law of the State
pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 2.01 (West 1961). See Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
In Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218 (Ky. 1973), the Kentucky Court of
Appeals interpreted that state's open court provision, KY. CONST. § 14, in
conjunction with other constitutional provisions to deny the legislature any
power to abolish common law rights of action. 497 S.W.2d at 222.
'"In Kentucky the legislature cannot abolish existing common law rights of
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not violative of their state's open courts provision adhere to the
proposition that a legislature may abolish any right which has not
yet vested.1" These jurisdictions interpret the provision as being
applicable only to the judiciary, prohibiting the courts' abolishing
of common law rights. 8' The latter courts framed their argument
in terms of due process, however.182 Equating due process and open
courts provisions in this manner has been criticized because it
renders the open courts provisions meaningless. 83
Individual architects' and builders' statutes have also been held
unconstitutional on grounds that the act violated constitutional
provisions requiring that legislation be limited to a single subject
and that the subject of legislation be clearly reflected in its title."'
Other jurisdictions have sustained these statutes against almost
identical constitutional challeges.l" The principal difference in
the decisions considering title-subject provisions involves an issue
of interpretation. 8 The objects of such a constitutional provision
action. Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 224 (Ky. 1973). The Florida Supreme
Court did not entirely prohibit abolishment of common law rights. Writing
for the Florida court, Justice Adkins said: "[T]he Legislature is without power to
abolish such a right without providing a reasonable alternative ...unless ...
[it] can show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment . . . and
no alternative method of meeting such public necessity can be shown." Kluger
v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
18SReeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 650-51 (1976);
Joseph v. Burns, 260 Ore. 493, 491 P.2d 203, 207-08 (1971); Freezer Storage,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978). See also
text accompanying notes 156-67 supra. See generally 16A C.J.S. Constitutional
Law S 709-10 (1956), and cases cited therein.
181 E.g., Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 650 (1976);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 341 A.2d
184, 189 (1975), aff'd, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978).
12 E.g. Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647, 651-52 (1976);
Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 341 A.2d
184, 188 (1975), aff'd, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978) (in which the Superior
Court said: "If the 1965 Act abolished a cause of action before it accrued then
no violation of due process is involved").
18 Note, The Utah Product Liability Limitation of Action: An Unfair Resolu-
tion of Competing Concerns, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 149, 156 n.42 (creating "a
redundancy in the constitution").
'"See Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306
(1974). A typical "title-subject" provision reads: "Each law shall contain but one
subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title." ALA. CONST. S 45.
85O'Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, Consulting Engrs., 84 Mich. App. 764, 270
N.W.2d 690 (1978); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 218 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
I" Compare Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala, 191, 291 So. 2d
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are threefold. First, the title of each law should inform the general
public of the subject of the pending legislation so that they may be
fairly apprised of legislative actions and may make their views
on the legislation known.'87 Second, the title should make legislators
aware of the subject of the act so that they do not perform their
job "deceived or ignorant of what they are doing.' 88 Finally, the
bill should encompass only one subject to prevent legislative log-
rolling by embracing several distinct matters in one bill, some or
all of which may be impossible to pass separately. "'
The use of the term "statute of limitations" when referring to
statutes of repose is anomalous because statutes of repose are
substantive determinations of the rights to be afforded citizens
of a state. Statutes of limitations procedurally limit the time in
which suit may be filed. Statutes of repose, however, cut off
any right of action after passage of a certain period of years. '
The misuse of terminology to obscure the substance of the re-
pose provisions has been criticized as an abuse of the lawmak-
ing function."' Nevertheless a constitutional provision requiring
that an act contain only "one subject," and that the subject be
clearly expressed in the title, has been interpreted to allow a legis-
lature to include in the act any and all matters having a logical or
natural connection with the title.'" Under this interpretation, a
statute of repose passed under the title "Limitation on Actions
• ..on Construction Projects" was held not offensive to a title-
subject provision in a state constitution.' Since the main goal of
306, 309 (1974) (striking down an act entitled "To regulate further the time
within which actions ...must be commenced." 1969 Ala. Acts no. 788) with
Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 218 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91
N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977) (upholding "Relating to Construction Projects; and
Providing for a Limitation on Actions for Defective or Unsafe Conditions on
Construction Projects." 1967 N.M. Laws ch. 193).
187Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306,
308 (1974).
188 Id.
"I Id. See also Posados v. Warner, Barnes & Co., 279 U.S. 340, 344 (1929).
'" Bagby Elevator & Elec. Co. v. McBride, 292 Ala. 191, 291 So. 2d 306,
309 (1974). See Comment, supra note 67, at 384. See also White v. Violent
Crimes Comp. Bd., 76 N.J. 368, 388 A.2d 206 (1976).
91 Comment, supra note 67, at 384.
"' Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 218 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977).
193 Id.
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the itle-subject provisions is reasonable notice, however, it is un-
fair to expect those unfamiliar with legal terminology to com-
prehend that a law abolishing certain rights of action may be passed
under the title of a statute of limitations or of a limitation of
actions.
Finally, statutes of repose have been held unconstitutional as
violative of provisions forbidding special legislation."' A special
law is one that favors one group over other groups similarly situ-
ated or affected.' The Illinois and Wyoming Supreme Courts have
declared that the effect of architects' and contractors' statutes of
repose is to grant those persons a special immunity from suit."'
Other courts, however, have held that the class of persons included
under an architects' and builders' statute is sufficiently large to
avoid the statute's classification as a prohibited special law." ' The
difference again is one of interpretation."' If the statutory class is
19Id., Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590-91 (1967);
Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2815 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. May 21, 1980).
See also Massery, supra note 19, at 548. A typical special law provision reads:
"The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which
has been or can be provided for by general law .... ." PA. CONsT. art. III, § 32.
195 BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1253 (5th ed. 1979).
a Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Il. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d 588, 590 (1967); Phillips
v. ABC Builders, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2815, 2816 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. May 21, 1980).
"" See Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662,
667-68 (1972); Howell v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 568 P.2d 214, 220 (Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3, 569 P.2d 413 (1977); Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 718-20 (1978); Yakima Fruit &
Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heat & Power Co., 81 Wash. 2d 528, 503 P.2d
108 (1972).
198 Interpreting identical language, Illinois and New Jersey courts reached
different conclusions. Compare Skinner v. Anderson, 38 Ill. 2d 455, 231 N.E.2d
588, 590 (1967) (interpreting ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 24f (Smith-Hurd 1966))
with Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662, 668 (1972)
(interpreting 2A N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14-1.1 (West Supp. 1979)). The Illinois
court held that the effect of the section was to grant to architects and con-
tractors a special or exclusive immunity, 231 N.E.2d at 590, whereas the New
Jersey court read the statutory language broadly, 293 A.2d at 666.
Two other jurisdictions have interpreted similar language broadly. See Howell
v. Burk, 90 N.M. 688, 586 P.2d 214, 218-21 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 91 N.M. 3,
569 P.2d 413 (1977) (interpreting N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27 (1978)); Freezer
Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 234 Pa. Super. Ct. 441, 341 A.2d 184,
186 (1975), afl'd, 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715 (1978) (interpreting 42 PA. CONsT.
STAT. ANN. S 5536(a) (Purdon 1979) (formerly 12 PA. STAT. ANN. § 65.1)).
But see Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2,815 (Wyo. Sup. Ct. May
21, 1980). Interpreting comparable language, the Wyoming court held that the
statute conferred immunity only on a "narrow spectrum of defendants." Id. at
2,816 (interpreting 2 Wyo. STAT. S 1-3-111 (1977)).
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defined in general terms,' " the statute should be upheld as not
violative of constitutional prohibitions against special legislation."'
IV. CONCLUSION
The loss distribution mechanism inherent in the tort system re-
flects a societal policy judgment that those persons best able to
correct a defect and to avoid an injury should bear the costs which
accompany the damage caused by the defect."' A statute of repose
represents a countervailing policy that persons should be allowed to
plan their affairs with a reasonable degree of certainty,"' and is
based primarily upon fears of liability for claims arising from de-
fects in older products."3 The counter-attack on the citadel of strict
liability has focused on a compromise solution which attempts to
accommodate both policies, as reflected by the adoption of statutes
of repose in many states.'" The Model Uniform Products Liability
Act' recently promulgated by the Department of Commerce evi-
dences the tensions surrounding such a compromise. It attempts
to assuage manufacturers' concerns by establishing a statutory pre-
sumption that a product has been used beyond its useful safe life
if it causes an injury after the expiration of the statutory period.'"
The UPLA also attempts to avoid the most damning objection to
statutes of repose, from the standpoint of compensation and risk-
199See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980) ("one
who . . . sells, distributes, leases, assembles, installs, produces, manufactures,
fabricates, prepares, constructs, packages, labels, markets, repairs, maintains, or
otherwise is involved in placing a product in the stream of commerce.").
200 See generally Sentell, When Is A Special Law Unlawfully Special?, 27
MERCER L. REV. 1167 (1976).
20'See W. PROSSER, supra note 23, at § 69i. See generally Klemme, The
Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153 (1976); Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961).
212 See notes 63-68 supra, and accompanying text.
203 See TASK FORCE INSURANCE STUDY, supra note 18, at 4-92; INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT VII-21 (1977), which states:
"Regardless of what the data show, our insurance study suggests it is the under-
writer's concern about the potential loss regarding older products that may be
an important factor of the increase in liability premiums for manufacturers of
durable goods."
204See notes 21, 131 supra.




distribution, by suspending the application of the statutory bar/
presumption if the injury-causing aspect of the product was not
reasonably discoverable within the statutory period. Absent any
solid documentation connecting the recent increases in the costs
of products liability insurance with claims arising from older
products, it would seem that the alleged products liability problem
would be best solved by insurance regulators rather than by major
reform of the law of torts.2"
The alteration or abolishment of consumers' rights of action
against manufacturers in the event of an injury caused by an older
product is a question of grave concern. From a constitutional per-
spective the reception of statutes of repose has been mixed, vary-
ing with their judicial interpretation in light of pertinent statutory
and constitutional provisions.' The decision to shift the costs of
injuries caused by older products from manufacturers and con-
sumers to the individual who suffers the injury is not to be made
lightly. Because of the complex nature of such a policy decision,
and in view of the inherent constitutional difficulties surrounding
statutes of repose, 2 * a re-examination of the alleged problem of
products liability insurance is a necessity. Other alternatives, such
as a statute of limitations based upon a product's useful safe life
or insurance reform, should be considered."' It is only through
thorough analysis of the problem that well-reasoned policy deci-
sions will result.
"
1Id. at § 110(B) (2) (d).
'" See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 244. See also text accompanying
note 71 supra.
209 See notes 100-200 supra, and accompanying text.
2'0 See notes 63-200 supra, and accompanying text.
"I See notes 42-52 supra, and accompanying text.
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